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I. INTRODUCTION
Created in 1975, the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insur-
ance Act (No-Fault Act) is a first party system which was designed to
meet a number of purposes. Primary among those, was to provide
for the basic expenses such as medical bills and wage loss incurred
by someone injured in an automobile accident. For the most part,
the No-Fault Act has successfully and efficiently met its intended
goals. However, there are a number of no-fault issues which recur
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in day to day practice which effectively contravene the intended
purposes of the No-Fault Act.
As a first party system, a person injured in a motor vehicle col-
lision is often under the impression that they will encounter no dif-
ficulties with their own insurance company. In fact, the claimant's
reaction to their own insurance company's apparent lack of coop-
eration is usually more extreme than their reaction to the other
party's lack of cooperation. A claimant frequently finds herself in
an adversarial position with her own insurance company, needing
to hire an attorney, and sometimes engaging in expensive and
time-consuming litigation.
The objective of this article is to consider whether the No-Fault
Act has successfully created a system of small claims arbitration
which has decreased the expense of and complexity of litigation
and, assured prompt payment for medical treatment.
II. PURPOSES OF THE NO-FAULT ACT
From a practical standpoint, the no-fault system was designed
to efficiently pay medical bills, wage loss, and other benefits to
someone as a result of an automobile accident without any refer-
ence to fault. Prior to the No-Fault Act, the primary problem faced
by someone injured as a result of someone else's fault was the in-
ability to pay for her medical bills and wage loss which continued to
mount as the parties engaged in lengthy litigation. The drafters of
the No-Fault Act hoped to satisfy a number of purposes. Section
65B.42 specifically cites the intended purposes of the No-Fault Act:
(1) To relieve the severe economic distress of uncompen-
sated victims of automobile accidents within this state by
requiring automobile insurers to offer and automobile
owners to maintain automobile insurance policies or
other pledges of indemnity which will provide prompt
payment of specified basic economic loss benefits to vic-
tims of automobile accidents without regard to whose
fault caused the accident;
(2) To prevent the overcompensation of those automo-
bile accident victims suffering minor injuries by restricting
the right to recover general damages to cases of serious in-
jury;
(3) To encourage appropriate medical and rehabilitation
treatment of the automobile accident victim by assuring
prompt payment for such treatment;
[Vol. 241004
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(4) To speed the administration of justice, to ease the
burden of litigation on the courts of this state, and to cre-
ate a system of small claims arbitration to decrease the ex-
pense of and to simplify litigation, and to create a system
of mandatory inter company arbitration to assure a
prompt and proper allocation of the costs of insurance
benefits between motor vehicle insurers;
(5) To correct imbalances and abuses in the operation of
the automobile accident tort liability system, to provide
offsets to avoid duplicate recovery, to require medical ex-
amination and disclosure, and to govern the effect of ad-
vance payments prior to final settlement of liability.'
Simply put, the no-fault system was intended to allow an injured
person to be able to quickly seek medical treatment and have their
medical bills paid for with no dispute between the injured person
and their no-fault carrier.
The objective of this article is to consider whether the No-Fault
Act has successfully created a system of small claims arbitration
which has decreased the expense of and complexity of litigation
and, assures prompt payment for medical treatment.
III. AREAS OF DISPUTE
A. The Duty to Attend an Independent Medical Examination and the
Effect of Failing To Do So
Under most no-fault automobile insurance policies, the claim-
ant is entitled to $20,000 in medical expense coverage and $20,000
in wage loss coverage. However, in most cases, before the claimant
has exhausted her $20,000 in medical coverage (and frequently
within several months of the injury-causing collision), the no-fault
carrier will ask the claimant to undergo an independent medical
examination. In the majority of cases, the examining doctor will
opine that the claimant no longer needs medical treatment and/or
is capable of returning to work without restriction. As a result, fol-
lowing most independent medical examinations, the claimant's no-
fault benefits will be terminated before they have used up their
available coverage. With that expected outcome, a recurring area
of dispute in the no-fault system is the question of when a claimant
is obligated to attend an independent medical examination and
1. MINN. STAT. § 65B.42 (1996)
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the effect of a failure to attend.
1. Statutory right to an examination
A no-fault carrier's right to request a medical examination is
governed by Section 65B.56 which provides:
Any person with respect to whose injury benefits are
claimed under a plan of reparation security shall, upon
request of the reparation obligor from whom recovery is
sought, submit to a physical examination by a physician or
physicians selected by the obligor as may reasonably be
required.
The costs of any examinations requested by the obligor
shall be borne entirely by the requesting obligor. Such
examinations shall be conducted within the city, town, or
statutory city of residence of the injured person. If there
is no qualified physician to conduct the examination
within the city, town, or statutory city of residence of the
injured person, then such examination shall be con-
ducted at another place of the closest proximity to the in-
jured person's residence.
The insurer's right to have an independent medical examina-
tion is not an absolute right. Situations arise in which recent case
law suggests that a claimant is not obligated to attend an independ-
ent medical examination (IME).
2. Discussion of case law
Case law has established that an insured's failure to attend an
independent medical examination does not automatically termi-
nate no-fault benefits. The issue was first addressed in the case of
Maryland Casualty Company v. Harvey. In that case, the court of ap-
peals determined that the insurer's failure to pay basic economic
loss benefits within 30 days after proof of loss as required under the
statute precluded termination of benefits based on the claimant's
4failure to attend the IME. The Court suggested that since the no-
2. Id. § 65B.56, subd. 1.
3. 474 N.W.2d 189 (Minn. App. Ct. 1991), overruled by Neal v. State Farm
Mut. Ins. Co., 529 N.W.2d 330 (Minn. 1995).
4. See id. at 193-94. The court noted that "[t]he statute rejects automatic
termination of benefits for failure to attend an examination." Id. at 194. "Rather, the
statute allows the arbitrator to consider an insured's noncooperation with reason-
able medical examination requests." Id. at 193.
1006 [Vol. 24
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fault carrier had not fulfilled its obligations under the contract,
that the claimant should not be required to fulfill his or her obliga-
5tion to attend the medical examination. The Harvey court went on
to indicate that the issue of whether or not the claimant reasonably
failed to attend the examination is a question of fact for the arbitra-
6tor to decide.
The second case which determined that there is no absolute
right to an independent medical examination is Milwaukee Mutual
Insurance Company v. Murphy.7 In Murphy, the claimant was injured
in an automobile accident in January, 1989.8 On September 19,
1989 his no-fault carrier, Milwaukee Mutual, scheduled an IME to
take place on October 26, 1989.9 On October 20, 1989, the claim-
ant wrote to his no-fault carrier indicating that he would not be at-
tending this scheduled IME because Milwaukee Mutual had not
paid over $800 in unpaid medical expenses, some of which had
been held for over 30 days.'0 The insurer wanted the exam to retro-
spectively determine whether certain bills were to be paid.1 Mr. Mur-
phy failed to attend the exam and Milwaukee Mutual then brought
a declaratory judgment action seeking an order that it was not re-
quired to pay further medical expense benefits due to Mr. Mur-
phy's failure to attend the IME.12 The trial court agreed with Mil-
waukee Mutual but was reversed by the court of appeals.
1 3
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals affirmed that
"[i]t is well established that an insurance policy is a contract," and
that "the Milwaukee Mutual policy is subject to the statutory re-
quirements of the Minnesota No-Fault Act."' 4 The court indicated
that the No-Fault Act "requires insurers to pay basic economic loss
benefits within 30 days after receipt of reasonable proof of loss"
and that "[b] enefits are overdue if not paid within 30 days after the
reparation obligor receives reasonable proof of the fact and
amount of loss realized."
15
5. See id. at 194.
6. See id.
7. 474 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
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In light of the above, the Murphy court ruled that the claimant
could reasonably refuse to attend an IME if the insurer has
breached the contract by not timely paying medical bills.16 "If Mil-
waukee Mutual breached the insurance contract by failing to pay
medical expense as they came due, Milwaukee Mutual cannot raise
Murphy's failure to attend an IME as a basis for terminating pay-
ment of benefits."" The decisions in Harvey and Murphy made it
clear that if benefits were overdue, the insured could reasonably re-
fuse to attend an independent medical examination.
The holdings in Harvey and Murphy were clouded by the su-
preme court's decision in Neal v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.1
In Neal, the claimant refused to attend a medical examination since
it was outside his city of residence.' 9 The Court determined that the
reasonableness of that failure to attend was a question for the arbi-
trator.20 However, the court in Neal also ruled for the first time that
it is appropriate for a no-fault insurer to "suspend" benefits, rather
than terminate benefits, until it has been determined by the arbi-
trator whether the failure to attend the medical examination was
21reasonable. Under Neal the first issue to be decided at an arbitra-
tion hearing is whether the claimant's refusal to attend the medical
examination was reasonable. 2 The court stated:
That the insurer suspends, rather than terminates, pay-
ment until the claimant has, upon request, submitted to a
physical examination scheduled in accordance with the
statutory guidelines seems eminently reasonable. There-
after, during the arbitration process, the parties may pro-
duce evidence of either the reasonableness of the refusal
to attend the IME so as to warrant the reinstatement of
benefits, in the case of the claimant, or the appropriate-
ness of the suspension of benefits for the claimant's lack
of cooperation within the terms of the insurance contract
16. See id.
17. Id.
18. 529 N.W.2d 330 (Minn. 1995).
19. See id. at 331.
20. See id. at 331-32.
21. Id. at 333. The court held that section 65B.56 "contemplates a balancing
of the entitlements of each party in the sense that the continued receipt of benefits
is conditioned on the reasonable submission to an independent medical examina-
tion." Id. This is because "[i]nasmuch as an insured is entitled to prompt payment
of benefits, an insurer correspondingly is entitled to prompt access to independent




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 4 [1998], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol24/iss4/5
1998] ENTITLEMENT TO BENEFITS: RECURRING DISPUTES
or Minn. Stat. § 65B.56, subd. 1 and the prejudice suf-
fered by the insurer in its efforts to gather information
with regard to the claim, in the case of the insurer.2"
3. Effect of the case law
In Neal the supreme court specifically overruled the court of
24appeals' decision in Harvey. However, the fact that the Neal court
did not overrule and, in fact, did not even address Murphy, has re-
sulted in some ongoing confusion. Procedurally, a claimant can
still refuse to attend an IME if the no-fault carrier has not paid all
of the bills up to the date of the IME. Typically, the no-fault carrier
would then suspend benefits under the authority of Neal until an
arbitrator can address the reasonableness of the failure to attend
the medical examination.
Confusion under Neal has also resulted in questions of what
happens after the arbitrator makes his or her initial decision re-
garding the reasonableness of the failure to attend. If the arbitra-
tor determines that the failure to attend was reasonable, are unpaid
medical bills up to the date of the arbitration automatically payable
without even showing that the medical treatment was reasonable?
Or, is the claimant still required to prove the reasonableness and
necessity of the treatment even though there has been no termina-
tion of benefits?
Conversely, if the arbitrator determines that the claimant's
failure to attend the examination was not reasonable, even more
chaos may ensue. If the failure to attend the examination was not
reasonable and the claimant is ordered to attend the IME, are
benefits then reinstated once the claimant simply attends the
medical examination? Or, assuming that the benefits are termi-
nated following the IME, is the claimant entitled to make a claim
for benefits dating back to the original suspension of benefits or
dating back to only the termination of benefits following the IME?
The answers to these questions are as unclear as the arbitration
decisions that have addressed them. The supreme court in Neal
made a great effort to specifically create the concept of "suspen-
sion" of benefits versus termination,25 but the court failed to look
beyond and specify what effect the arbitrator's decision would have
23. Id.
24. See id. at 334.
25. See id. at 333.
1009
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regarding the reasonableness of failing to attend an IME.
The only appellate guidance to date is an unpublished deci-
sion of Jacobsen v. Auto Owners Insurance Company.26 In that case, the
no-fault carrier suspended benefits as authorized under Neal after
the claimant had failed to attend two IMEs. 7 The claimant's failure
to attend the two IMEs was based on the fact that some of his medi-
cal bills remained unpaid.2' The arbitrator determined that claim-
ant's failure to attend the medical examination was reasonable. 9
The Jacobsen court sheds some light on the effect of the arbitrator's
decision in that case by indicating that:
Neal's holding does not mandate termination of all bene-
fits, but describes suspension of benefits as an intermedi-
ate sanction "until the claimant has, upon request, sub-
mitted to a physical examination scheduled in accordance
with the statutory guidelines". Then the arbitrator may
decide, based on the evidence, whether to reinstate bene-
fits or suspend them due to lack of cooperation and
prejudice to the insurer.3 °
Without any further guidance from the court, the effect of an
arbitrator's decision in determining whether or not a failure to at-
tend an IME was reasonable remains subject to differing interpreta-
tion and argument. The decision in Neal places many claimants in
an unfair and unfavorable position. If the claimant's no-fault car-
rier has not paid medical bills up to the date of the IME, the claim-
ant should not be required to attend the exam as stated by the
court in Murphy.31 By allowing a suspension of benefits, the Neal
case seems to question the authority of Murphy but clearly does not32
overrule the decision in Murphy. Unfortunately, because of the
Neal decision, the claimant is no longer guaranteed "prompt pay-
ment" of their medical treatment as was intended by the drafters of
the No-fault Act.33 A claimant now begins treatment with any medi-
26. No. C3-96-587, 1996 WL 523805 (Minn. Ct. App.), review denied, (Minn.
Nov. 20, 1996).
27. See id. at *1.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. Id. at *2 (citations omitted).
31. See Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 474 N.W.2d 438, 440 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1991).
32. See Neal v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 529 N.W.2d 330, 333 (Minn. 1995).
33. Compare Neal, 529 N.W.2d at 333, with MINN. STAT. § 65B.42, subd. 3
(1996) (stating that one of the purposes of the No-Fault Act is to "encourage ap-
propriate medical and rehabilitation treatment of the automobile accident victim
1010 [Vol. 24
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cal provider not knowing whether prompt payment of their bills
will occur.
The financial stakes for a claimant have also become much
higher since the Neal decision. As mentioned above, the effect of
an arbitrator's decision on the reasonableness of failing to attend
the exam is far from crystal clear. By failing to attend the exam due
to the unpaid medical bill, a claimant must at least consider the
possibility that if a failure to attend is deemed unreasonable, a
claimant may then be personally responsible for the bill from the
date of suspension of benefits up to the time of attendance at the
IME. That is not necessarily the correct state of the law but could
be interpreted by an arbitrator as such.
4. Proposed Solutions
The proposed solution to eliminate all the confusion caused
by the Neal decision is to abandon the concept of "suspension of
benefits." Prior to the Neal case, the law was clear under Murphy
that all substantiated medical bills had to be paid prior to the
claimant attending an IME. 34 If a no-fault carrier had questions re-
garding some of the bills being submitted, an IME could then
quickly be set up. The Neal decision has created great chaos and
uncertainty regarding the effect of an arbitrator's decision as to
whether or not the failure to attend an IME was reasonable.
B. The Use of a Paper Review
Another recurring topic related to independent medical ex-
aminations is the use of "paper reviews" in the no-fault system. In-
stead of hiring a physician to examine the claimant for purposes of
an IME, some no-fault carriers choose to have a physician review
the medical records of the claimant only and not conduct a
physical examination. The claimant's termination of no-fault bene-
fits is then based on this "paper review" of the records.
The ability to use a paper review as the basis for terminating
no-fault benefits has become an age old debate. Occasionally, a dis-
trict court decision will surface allowing a paper review but it also
remains clear that there is no authority under the no-fault statute
for paper reviews. The specific language of the No-Fault Act sug-
by assuring prompt payment for such treatment.")
34. See Murphy, 474 N.W.2d at 440.
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gests that only physical, in person examinations, are authorized. 5
As a practical matter, paper reviews are used periodically and
are often admitted into evidence at the arbitration hearing. Dur-
ing the hearing, the credibility of the doctor issuing opinions with-
out actually seeing the claimant is strongly questioned.
C. Auditing Bills
An insurance practice related to paper reviews is bill auditing.
At the no-fault arbitration, the claimant must show that the amount
of the medical bill is reasonable for that given community. In other
words, the claimant's doctor cannot be charging a substantially
higher amount than a similar doctor in that area. Many no-fault
carriers are auditing the bills that are submitted. Little, if no, ex-
planation is usually given as to how the audit was conducted or by
whom. Nonetheless, the end result is that the no-fault carrier is
only willing to pay a portion of the actual amount charged. This re-
sults in the claimant being placed in an unfavorable position
through no fault of his or her own. Not surprisingly, the treating
provider is usually not willing to accept the amount recommended
by the bill auditing company and therefore pursues the claimant
for the unpaid portion of the bill. Some insurers will pay the disal-
lowed amount if it becomes clear that the insured is being pursued
for the balance of the bill.
Other insurers are taking a hard line. They agree only to "in-
demnify" the insured if the provider seeks and obtains a judgment
against the claimant for the remaining balance. Such a judgment
would presumably be obtained by the provider in small claims
court, after a collection agency has exhausted collection attempts
against the claimant. Claimants will have suffered damage to their
credit history and been subjected to costly litigation, before their
insurer will finally pay on their obligation.
For that reason, the use of bill auditing companies should not
be allowed under the no-fault system until the time of the actual
arbitration, if at all. At that point, the arbitrator could decide what,
if any, weight to give to the opinion of the auditing company.
Medical providers are also much more willing to acknowledge the
opinion of an arbitrator regarding the reasonableness of their bill
35. See MINN. STAT. § 65B.56, subd. 1 (1996) (requiring that a claimant "sub-
mit to a physical examination by a physician or physicians selected by the obligor
as may reasonably be required").
[Vol. 241012
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than they are to acknowledge the opinion of an unknown auditing
company hired by the no-fault carrier.
D. Arbitrator Bias and Post-Arbitration Relief
By statute, any dispute over no-fault benefits, which total
$10,000 or less must be resolved through no-fault arbitration.36 The
process by which an arbitrator is selected is somewhat unique. The
American Arbitration Association sends each party a list of four po-
tential arbitrators.37 Each party is then allowed to strike one poten-
tial arbitrator from the list and rank by preference the remaining
three arbitrators.u Between the two remaining names, the one that
is most preferred between both parties will be the arbitrator.39 In
the case of a tie between the two remaining names, the arbitrator is
randomly selected between the two. Each potential arbitrator is
more often than not, an attorney that practices in the personal in-
jury area and may practice exclusively as a plaintiff attorney or as a
defense attorney. 4° As a result, each arbitrator is required to dis-
close any potential conflict he or she may have with the parties in
that case and indicate whether or not that would affect the arbitra-
tor's ability to be impartial.4'
A recurring dispute regarding no-fault arbitrations involves the
claim of arbitrator bias. There is a concerted effort on behalf of
many no-fault carriers to disqualify plaintiffs lawyers as arbitrators
in no-fault cases based on the fact that they have handled or are
handling cases against that same insurance company. When deal-
ing with many of the larger insurance companies such as State
Farm, which insures the majority of drivers in this state, such a pro-
posal would effectively eliminate all plaintiff's lawyers from acting
as no-fault arbitrators. A recent Hennepin County District Court
case illustrates the lengths to which a no-fault carrier will go in an
attempt to disqualify an arbitrator.
36. See id.
37. See id., Rule 8.
38. See id.
39. See id.
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1. "Claimant Smith" v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company
On November 24, 1993 "Claimant Smith" was injured in a col-
lision and applied for and was paid no-fault benefits by State Farm.
On June 19, 1996 respondent State Farm scheduled an IME of Ms.
Smith to take place on August 5. At the time the IME was sched-
uled, State Farm had failed to pay approximately $2,000 in bills
from the Northwestern College of Chiropractic. Ms. Smith was
specifically referred there by her treating chiropractor for a func-
tional rehabilitation program, and there was even evidence to indi-
cate that State Farm had given pre-approval for the rehabilitation
program. Due to the unpaid medical bills, claimant's counsel sent
a letter to the no-fault adjuster asking that those bills be paid prior
to Ms. Smith's attendance at an IME. State Farm refused to pay the
bills.
Claimant Smith did not attend her independent medical ex-
amination under the authority of Murphy. State Farm then sus-
pended her no-fault benefits and Ms. Smith filed for arbitration
with the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") as required by
statute. Both parties executed their arbitrator strike lists and an
arbitrator was selected. The selected arbitrator indicated in his
background that he was a plaintiff's attorney. In his disclosure
statement, he revealed that he currently and in the past, had repre-
sented clients pursuing claims against State Farm or their insured.
The arbitrator also noted that he currently represented a client
pursuing a claim against State Farm which was being defended by
the law firm which was defending Ms. Smith's no-fault claim. The
arbitrator went on to note "I don't believe the circumstances affect
my ability to be impartial, but I am compelled to make the disclo-
sures."
After this disclosure was made, State Farm petitioned the AAA
to have the arbitrator removed. AAA received written arguments
on the matter and issued a letter indicating that the arbitrator
"should be reaffirmed as the arbitrator on this file." Following this
decision by AAA, State Farm failed to appeal AAA's decision to the
No-Fault Standing Committee as provided for under Rule 4 of the
Policy Statement of the Minnesota No-Fault Standing Committee.
Likewise, State Farm failed to object to the arbitrator prior to exer-
cising their strikes as required under Rule 8 of the No-fault Arbitra-
tion Rules. The case then proceeded to arbitration before the arbi-
trator who issued an award in favor of the claimant. Following that
[Vol. 241014
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decision, State Farm made a motion to vacate the arbitrator's deci-
sion arguing that he exceeded his authority by determining a ques-
tion of law and also arguing that the case should be remanded to a
different arbitrator due to the arbitrator's history of handling
claims against State Farm.
Surprisingly, a Hennepin County trial judge agreed with State
Farm and determined that the arbitrator was biased and should not
have been an arbitrator on the case against State Farm. The
judge's decision was based on the arbitrator's plaintiff's practice
and "the fact that he actively represents clients who are opposed to
State Farm."
No-fault carriers are routinely asking AAA to exclude as arbi-
trator a plaintiff's lawyer who has ever handled a claim against that
insurance company.
2. Discussion of the "Smith" decision
The trial court's decision is wrong for a number of reasons.
(Unfortunately, the claimant opted not to appeal the decision on
this relatively small no-fault claim). The judge's decision would
eliminate the majority of potential arbitrators qualified to hear no-
fault cases. To suggest that an attorney who has handled claims
against an insurance company in the past would not be "free from
appearance of impropriety" on an unrelated case is unprece-
dented.
Secondly, the judge's decision is being used as an attempt to
broadly eliminate all plaintiff lawyers as potential arbitrators in-
stead of examining the circumstances on a case-by-case basis. Rules
8 and 10 of the Minnesota No-Fault Arbitration Rules and Rule 14
from the AAA Policy Statement allow AAA and the No-Fault Stand-
ing Committee to examine the particular facts of each case to de-
termine whether or not the arbitrator has a conflict of interest
which would prevent him or her from deciding a case based on a
number of factors, including whether the potential conflict is con-
42
tinuing, intermittent, singular, recent, distant or substantial. The
judge's decision undermines the authority of AAA and the No-Fault
Standing Committee and suggests that instead of examining indi-
vidual factors on a case-by-case basis, the analysis should be solely
based on whether that arbitrator has ever handled any claims
42. See, e.g., id., Rules 8 & 10.
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13
Meyer and Downes: Entitlement to Benefits: Recurring Areas of Dispute
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1998
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
against the respondent insurance company.43
The problems encountered in the Smith case lie not only with
the judge's decision but also with the current no-fault arbitration
system. One of the most troubling aspects involving the Smith deci-
sion, and many cases like it, is that the respondent was allowed to
wait and see what the arbitrator's decision was before appealing to
the district court. Either party is essentially entitled to take a "wait
and see" approach to any issue they have regarding the arbitrator's
bias. For example, in Smith, State Farm objected to the arbitrator
being appointed as the arbitrator prior to the hearing. However,
once AAA had denied State Farm's request to remove the arbitrator
as the arbitrator, there was no provision requiring a party to appeal
AAA's decision regarding arbitrator bias prior to the hearing.
Ms. Smith's case illustrates the delay and expense that can be
associated with disputes arising under the No Fault Act. Ms. Smith
has now been holding onto unpaid medical bills for a year and a
half and is being pursued by medical providers and collection
agencies.44 She is concerned that her case will go on so long that
the medical provider will no longer be willing to wait for the result
of her litigation and will fully pursue collection of the medical bills
through a lawsuit of its own. She has delayed seeking appropriate
medical treatment for fear that she will be responsible for the bills,
a result that runs counter to one of the express purposes for the
No-Fault Act: "[t] o encourage appropriate medical and rehabilita-
tion treatment of the automobile accident victim by assuring
prompt payment for such treatment.,
45
Unfortunately, too many no-fault claims still end up in costly
litigation. If a party claims that an arbitrator is biased prior to the
hearing, there is very little to prevent that party from taking a wait-
and-see approach to first determine what the arbitrator's award will
be before deciding to appeal the issue of bias to the court. Any
claim of arbitrator bias that is present before the arbitration hear-
43. The authors of this article have proposed to the No-Fault Standing Com-
mittee that a change be made to Rule 8 of the No-fault Arbitration Rules indicat-
ing that an arbitrator will not be removed from a case based solely on the fact that
they have had cases or are handling cases against the respondent insurance com-
pany. This proposed rule is under consideration by the Standing Committee.
44. Ms. Smith's no-fault benefits were terminated on July 25, 1996. She is
currently waiting for her second arbitration to be scheduled while the Respondent
again petitions that any plaintiff's lawyers be removed as arbitrators in her second
arbitration. Her medical bills for the last year and a half remain unpaid.
45. MINN. STAT. § 65B.42, subd. 3 (1996).
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ing ought to be determined prior to the actual hearing. Otherwise,
it does nothing but produce a cycle of litigation in which the no-
fault claim is arbitrated, then appealed to the district court and if
successful at the district court it is then sent back to begin the
whole process again. Such a process clearly does not "speed the
administration of justice", "ease the burden of litigation," or "de-
crease the expense of and simplify litigation" as intended by the
drafters of the No-Fault Act.46
3. Proposed Solution
The proposed solution to this effort of attempting to remove
all plaintiffs attorneys as potential arbitrators is to have any ques-
tion of arbitrator bias determined solely by the No-Fault Standing
Committee. The Committee is a group of practicing attorneys, both
plaintiff and defense, experienced in the no-fault area, originally
appointed by the Supreme Court.4 7 New members are continuously
appointed by the current board.4  The twelve members of the
Standing Committee are responsible for the administration of the
no-fault arbitration system.49 According to the Minnesota No-Fault
Arbitration Rule, if the American Arbitration Association refuses to
remove an arbitrator based on a claim of bias, that claim must then
be appealed to the Standing Committee.50 The Standing Commit-
tee's decision should be the final determination of whether an arbi-
trator should be removed. Having the Standing Committee deter-
mine the issue of arbitrator bias will result in consistent and
thorough decisions. The current system, which allows the Standing
Committee's decision to be appealed to the district court, can re-
sult in a number of inconsistent decisions by district court judges
who may not be familiar with the no-fault system.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota No-Fault system is meeting many of its stated
purposes. However, there are recurring areas of dispute which
serve to unnecessarily prolong disputes, create expensive litigation,
and dissuade injured people from getting necessary and reasonable
46. Id., subd. 4.
47. See id. § 65B.525, Rule 1.
48. See id., Rule 2.
49. See id., Rule 1.
50. See id., Rule 8.
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medical treatment. The No-Fault Act was specifically designed to
be interpreted liberally in favor of the claimant. Failure to promptly
pay medical bills prior to an IME, use of paper reviews, audits of
medical bills, and attempts to remove an arbitrator based solely on
his or her background as a plaintiff's attorney, all represent barriers
to the claimant and prevent the intended purposes of the No-Fault
Act from being met.
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